A practical proposal for ensuring the provenance of hardware devices and their safe operation by Kovalchuk, Yevgeniya et al.
 A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL FOR ENSURING THE 
PROVENANCE OF HARDWARE DEVICES AND THEIR 
SAFE OPERATION 
Y. Kovalchuk*, W.G.J. Howells†, H. Hu*, D. Gu*, K.D. McDonald-Maier* 
*School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, UK, 
yvkova@essex.ac.uk, hhu@essex.ac.uk, dgu@essex.ac.uk, kdm@essex.ac.uk  




Keywords: ICmetrics, security, encryption, embedded 
systems. 
Abstract 
This paper presents a novel technique, termed ICmetrics 
(Integrated Circuit metrics), that can be used for the purposes 
of generating encryption keys, electronic signatures, detecting 
attempts of frauds, or preventing malfunction of hardware 
components and systems. The ICmetrics technology is based 
on employment of measurable features derived from 
characteristics of a given electronic device in order to 
generate an identifier that uniquely determines or describes 
the device. Any changes in the identifier during consequent 
device’s operation would signal about a possible safety or 
security breach within the electronic system. After a detailed 
overview of the ICmetrics technology and comparing it to the 
alternative techniques commonly used for securing electronic 
systems, the paper discusses challenges of developing the 
technology and brings an example to demonstrate how these 
issues are being addressed. 
1 Introduction 
Digital devices penetrate every facet of our daily life 
nowadays. As we rely, and in many cases are dependable, on 
electronic systems and hardware devices, it is essential to 
ensure their safe operation. In addition, the issue of security 
arises as we create, store, share, and manage information in 
digital format. 
 
This paper is concerned with both safety and security of 
exploiting electronic devices despite their design or operating 
conditions (e.g., this could be mobile devices used by 
consumers, robots assisting humans or used in manufacturing, 
or distributed system sensing an environment, etc.). More 
specifically,  the paper proposes a novel technique, termed 
ICmetrics (Integrated Circuit metrics), that can be used for the 
purposes of generating encryption keys, electronic signatures, 
detecting attempts of frauds, or preventing malfunction of 
hardware components and systems. 
 
Essentially, the ICmetrics technology is based on employment 
of measurable features derived from characteristics of a given 
electronic device in order to generate an identifier that 
uniquely determines or describes the device. This identifier 
can be subsequently used for generating a unique encryption 
key or signature to protect the device or messages sent 
from/to it. Moreover, any misuse of the device would result in 
change of the identifier (and therefore the encryption key 
associated with it), signalling thus a safety or security breach. 
For instance, ICmetrics may prevent unauthorised access to 
embedded and distributed devices that are connected 
wirelessly; it could prevent the fraudulent cloning or imitation 
of a device in order to compromise its identity and subsequent 
communication. It can allow for implicit detection of 
tampering of the software or hardware associated with the 
device via the inclusion of spyware or similar virus software. 
 
In the following sections, we explain how ICmetrics works, 
compare it to other popular techniques used for securing 
electronic systems, and discuss the advantages of the 
proposed technology. We then outline the challenges that are 
associated with developing ICmetrics and bring an example 
from the research we are currently undertaking to address 
these issues. In particular, we are looking at the problem of 
finding suitable ICmetrics features, both from the point of 
view of obtaining data and the properties which such features 
should possess so as unique and stable identifiers can be 
generated. The final section concludes the paper and 
highlights the major findings from our current research. 
2 The ICmetrics technology 
The ICmetrics technology is based on the idea that electronic 
devices often function under unique conditions; they sense 
different environments, run different software, perform 
different tasks and interact with different users. Various 
features can be extracted from digital devices’ operation that 
may be integrated together to generate unique identifiers for 
each of the devices or create unique profiles that describe the 
devices’ actual behaviour. 
 
In a sense, the ICmetrics technology can be seen analogous to 
a biometrics based system, but employing devices’ features 
instead of those intrinsic to humans. While biometric features 
can be extracted from analysis of human characteristics, such 
as iris, fingerprints or voice, potential sources for ICmetrics 
 features include programmable structures, circuits, sensors, 
communication peripherals, etc. Our preliminary 
investigation has shown that ICmetrics features may be 
extracted from, for example, program sequences, contents of 
selected memory locations, or access frequency and the 
system’s input/output with its environment. Such features can 
be used for both, generating unique encryption keys or digital 
signatures (e.g. to encrypt message sent from or stored on the 
device), and detecting cases of untypical device’s behaviour 
(e.g., due to failure of its electronic elements or intrusion of a 
parasite program code). 
2.1 Comparison to alternative techniques 
There have been many techniques developed for the purposes 
of securing electronic systems, both on the level of hardware 
(e.g. the Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) technologies 
[14] and in particular, Hardware Intrinsic Security [5]) and 
the user (e.g., biometrics, encryption, passwords etc.). 
ICmetrics can be seen as a hybrid approach that exploits 
features derived based on the interaction of the hardware with 
their users and/or environment.  
 
While PUF-based techniques may be successful in providing 
secure key storage mechanisms or preventing cloning of 
hardware devices [5], they are not able to address attacks on 
the software level. Any unauthorised changes to program(s) 
running on hardware devices (e.g., inclusion of spyware or 
similar virus software) may undermine the security and safety 
of the whole electronic system. 
 
Passwords or encryption keys can be used to control access to 
software programs and information stored on hardware 
devices; however both can be forgotten or stolen. Similarly, 
the major weakness of the many existing biometric-based 
systems is that they rely on the explicit template storage [7]. 
Although some work has also been done on direct encryption 
of keys [1,2,8,11-13,16], these proposals apply to a restricted 
problem domain and do not successfully overcome the 
problems associated with intra-sample variation in the generic 
case. In addition, these authorisation techniques cannot detect 
improper operation of digital devices.  
 
The ICmetrics technology addresses the above issues and can 
ensure both security and safety of electronic systems. In 
summary, the technology provides the following advantages 
over other approaches used for securing electronic systems: 
? The removal of the need to store any form of template for 
validating devices. Unique identifiers for the devices are 
generated in real time based on the devices’ current 
operation and predetermined feature values distributions. 
? There is no back door. The security of a system will be as 
strong as the ICmetrics associated with it and the 
encryption algorithm employed. The only mechanisms to 
gain subsequent access are to provide another sample of 
the ICmetrics or to break the cipher employed by the 
encryption technology. 
? The compromise of a system does not release sensitive 
ICmetrics template data which would allow unauthorised 
access to other systems protected by the same ICmetrics 
or indeed any system protected by any other ICmetrics 
templates present. 
? The removal of the need for the storage of the private key 
associated with the encryption system. This is a natural 
consequence of the system since the key will be uniquely 
associated with the given ICmetrics sample and a further 
ICmetrics sample may be used to regenerate the required 
private key. As there is no physical record of the key, it is 
not possible to compromise the security of sensitive data 
via unauthorised access to the key. 
? Tampering with the constitution of a hardware device 
will cause its behaviour to change, potentially causing the 
features underlying the ICmetrics to change, perhaps 
dramatically, thus causing the generated ICmetrics to 
change. Consequently, a faulty or maliciously tampered 
device will be autonomously prevented from decrypting 
its own stored data or participating in any initiated secure 
communications, as the regenerated keys will differ from 
those created before its integrity was compromised. In 
other words, the ICmetrics approach can be made to fail 
securely and safely; it also provides a very high 
immunity from cloning and tampering. 
2.2 Current development of ICmterics 
ICmetrics is a novel concept. At this early stage of our 
research, we explore the possibility of applying the ICmetrics 
technology for the purposes of generating stable encryption 
keys based on the features derived from embedded systems’ 
operation (see section 4 for details). 
 
In its current state, the ICmetrics system is designed to be 
employed on previously unseen devices and to faithfully 
reproduce encryption keys for such devices on further 
application to them by examining a pre-defined set of 
measurable features of such devices. However, the system 
does require detailed knowledge of the likely distribution of 
such features within their domain of possible values for 
typical devices. Therefore, a significant calibration phase is 
required for each application domain for which the ICmetrics 
system is to be used prior to its employment in the generation 
of encryption keys. This calibration phase operates on 
samples taken from typical example devices which may or 
may not include devices for which encryption keys will 
subsequently be required. Although the system is, subsequent 
to the calibration phase, designed to operate on previously 
unseen devices, this is governed by the restriction that the 
measured features will behave approximately as predicted by 
analysis of the sample devices. 
 
ICmetrics is therefore a two phase system: (1) Calibration 
phase is applied only once (or every time the operational 
conditions of the given device(s) change); (2) Operation 
phase is applied each time an encryption key is desired for the 
given device. 
  




Figure 2: Mapped distributions of program counter values. 
 
 
The calibration phase consists of the following three steps: 
1. Record a set of desired measurements (features) 
associated with the devices in the given set. For example, 
the program counter values of a processor core can be 
logged during execution of various software programs on 
hardware devices and considered as ICmetrics features. 
2. Generate feature distributions for each feature tabulating 
the frequency of each occurrence of each discrete value 
within the given value scale for each device. Figure 1 
shows an example of the distributions of the program 
counter (address) values recorded for five different 
devices (see section 4.1 for configuration details). It may 
be noted from Figure 1, that there is a number of tightly 
grouped address values for each device, which makes the 
task of separating devices in the feature space difficult.  
3. Normalise the feature distributions generating 
normalisation maps for each feature. The purpose of this 
step is to bring unusual distributions of measured features 
(as can be seen from Figure 1) to their normal (Gaussian) 
form so as values suitable for key generation could be 
defined. As an example, Figure 2 represents feature 
distributions after applying the normalisation procedure 
over a limited set (identical for all devices) of original 
feature samples. Full details on the normalisation 
procedure can be found in our earlier work [10]. 
The operational phase includes three steps: 
1. Measure features (e.g. the program counter values) for 
the device for which an encryption key is desired. 
2. Apply the normalisation maps to generate values suitable 
for key generation. 
3. Apply the key generation algorithm. 
This means that subsequently to the normalization step, 
component feature values for a device must be combined in 
such a way to form a unique number so as to identify each 
device. This number will form the basis for the subsequent 
derivation of the key required for the actual encryption 
process. 
3 ICmetrics challenges 
While the ICmetrics technology may overcome many issues 
that can be found in traditional security approaches, it 
presents many research challenges to be addressed in order to 
build an effective security and safety infrastructure. Among 
these questions are the following: 
 
1. How to obtain the feature measurements in real time so 
as the current system performance is not impacted or this 
impact is minimal? 
Securely collecting and measuring features drawn from the 
performance of electronic devices is a major challenge. 
Appropriate hardware and software instrumentation is 
required in order to gain access to device’s features and 
properties during its performance. Such interfaces should 
allow for non-intrusive way of measuring and recording of 
feature values that does not change the system’s operation 
which is essential for all real-time applications. 
 
2. Which characteristics of devices’ behaviour could 
provide suitable ICmetrics features? 
The specific characteristics that can be used in ICmetrics may 
take the form of internal signal distributions or metrics 
derived from the highly changing signals. Real examples 
investigated so far include: the address and value from the 
data transactions of a processor, its program counter, and 
metrics for the effectiveness of the program and data caches 
derived from performance counters. The key observation 
made is that any modifications taking place to either the 
software executing on a given hardware configuration (in the 
form of the addition of Spyware or similar) or to the hardware 
(by tampering with its available memory, configuration or 
external sensors) manifest themselves in the form of 
variations in the measurable characteristics. This would have 
the significant effect of modifying any value derived from the 
data used for encryption or validation key production by the 
system, prohibiting its continued participation in any further 
secure communications or terminating its safe operation. 
Thus, these are all good examples of features to be considered 
for generating encryption keys. In general however, various 
application domains may require different features depending 
on the context and environment of their operation. It is 
important to determine the most suitable ones that would 
allow for generating a stable and secure encryption key for 
each particular case. 
 3. Which techniques can be used for analysing multimodal 
features that possess non-standard distributions and are 
different in nature? 
In the context of ICmetrics, analysis of the feature 
distributions associated with the embedded circuit features 
presents some novel challenges as compared to many 
traditional pattern recognition tasks. This is because many of 
the observed features possess highly non-standard multi-
modal distributions (see Figures 1 for example), often a 
product of the device under investigation operating in a 
number of distinct states. The problem of incorporating 
pattern features with unusual distributions is well known 
within pattern recognition problems, even if not easily 
addressed. The problem is, however, more acute when 
features are derived from characteristics of electronic devices, 
and appropriate techniques should be developed. This 
includes finding right techniques for classification and 
normalisation of data in multi-dimensional space. 
 
In our previous work [10], the target space was linear in 
nature. We used enhanced Peak-Trough detection [6,15] and 
kernel estimation algorithms [3] to determine the various 
modal clusters taking one feature at a time. Our current 
research, however, is focused on investigation of multi-
dimensional spaces combining various features where each 
circuit mode is equi-distant from every other. This would 
allow the system to be applied to devices which have not 
formed part of the calibration sample within any enrolment of 
known samples from the devices. Such a generalization 
provides an improved mapping onto the key generation space 
and allows the multi-modal nature of the feature distributions 
to be effectively integrated within the overall system. 
Considering multiple features that are different in nature has 
also another advantage of designing hybrid ICmetrics that can 
include features derived not only from hardware 
characteristics, but also from signals employed in human-
computer interfacing (e.g. voice, gestures, brain signals, etc.). 
 
4. Which algorithms should be employed for integrating 
ICmetrics feature values in order to achieve generation 
of stable encryption keys? 
The generation of encryption keys requires developing 
suitable methods for combining selected features so as to 
produce a unique basis number – an initial number unique to 
the electronic system from which actual encryption keys may 
be derived. The main requirement for such methods is that 
they should allow for generating basis numbers with low 
intra-sample variance (that is, the values produced for the 
same device) but high inter-sample variance (that is, the 
values produced for different devices) with the ideal case 
being no inter-sample overlap of potential basis numbers.  
 
5. How to build an evaluation and calibration platform? 
The stability of encryption keys generated by the ICmetrics 
system depends on several factors as discussed above, 
including: (i) number of devices available for training and the 
environment of their operation; (ii) features employed; (iii) 
mathematical algorithms and their settings used for feature 
processing (e.g., clustering, normalization, and de-correlation 
techniques); (iv) methods applied for combining selected 
features to generate a basis number. Therefore, it is important 
to ensure the evaluation platform is in place to allow for 
controlled experiments to test and compare performance of 
various algorithms for feature extraction and processing, both 
in isolation and their various combinations. It may well 
appear that certain algorithms work better for certain types of 
devices, and there should be a way to find right techniques for 
each case quickly and reliably.  
 
In addition to experimenting with various algorithms during 
the calibration phase, it is equally important to evaluate the 
system’s performance during its operational phase. In other 
words, once the system is trained on test devices, its ability to 
generate stable encryption keys for unseen devices of similar 
type has to be estimated.  Furthermore, taking into account 
that the conditions of operation of the same electronic device 
may change (e.g., a computer running a different software), 
the evaluation and calibration platform should also include 
interfaces for fast recalibration of the ICmetrics system. The 
interfaces should be convenient to use by non-experts to 
allow for the system to be deployed outside the laboratory.  
4 Example of identifying suitable ICmetrics 
features 
Among the challenges outlined in the previous sections, we 
focus our current research on finding suitable ICmetrics 
features and methods for obtaining them [9]. ICmetrics 
features are used for generating unique identifiers (basis 
numbers) for each of the electronic devices in the considered 
set based on circuits’ metrics so as stable encryption keys 
could be further generated from these identifiers. The main 
requirement for the basis number is that it should remain 
constant for a given device on each attempt of its generation, 
but distinct from the basis numbers generated for other 
devices employed in the operational set. Furthermore, it 
should not be possible to derive or estimate the encryption 
keys generated for other devices based on the basis number of 
a given device. In order to achieve this, it is important to find 
such features associated with electronic devices, which allow 
for separation of the devices in the feature space. 
 
In our previous work [9], we have explored the program 
counter of a processor core as a potential source for ICmetrics 
features. We have chosen this parameter since the set of the 
program counter distinct values is finite and is the same for a 
certain device (assuming the full program profile is taken), 
but is likely to vary from one device to another. In that study, 
we have found that separate values of the program counter do 
not always allow for unique identification of hardware 
devices. However, suitable ICmetrics features may be derived 
from frequencies of the program counter occurrences and 
their sequences observed during programs’ execution flow. 
 
Another alternative to use the program counter as the 
ICmetrics feature is to combine it with other measurements 
extracted from electronic devices’ operation. In the example 
below, we investigate this option by adding values of the 
 status register and stack pointer traced during program 
execution flow to the correspondent series of the program 
counter values. Having the requirement for the ICmetrics 
features that they should allow for separation of the 
considered devices in the feature space, we test if this can be 
achieved by combining the proposed three measurements 
(features): the program counter (PC), status register (SR), and 
stack pointer (SP). We first describe our hardware and 
software platform for logging feature values and then discuss 
the analysis we performed over the logs.  
4.1 Experimental platform 
For this study, we have employed a low resource embedded 
system based around an ARM7 processor core, in particular 
an Atmel AT91SAM7S256 microcontroller [17] and 
64Kbytes SRAM memory. We have used the combination of 
Eclipse [18], Open On-Chip Debugger (OOCD) [19], and 
JTAG programming port for programming the 
microcontroller, as well as tracing programs’ execution.  
 
We have used an intrusive single stepping tracing method to 
log feature values. While this method affects programs’ 
execution times, it does not change the execution flow, 
meaning that the proposed method provide the same PC, SR, 
and SP values as would have been obtained with non-
intrusive methods.  To register feature values, our tracing 
program halts the CPU by issuing OOCD commands [19] via 
a telnet port and logs every single CPU instruction, meaning 
that the complete profile of the program execution is 
obtained.  
 
Since at this early stage we have only been interested to see if 
the PC, SR, and SP could be used as the ICmetrics features, 
we have employed basic low complexity software routines to 
serve as a source of data so as to achieve visually 
representative and easily interpretable analysis results. More 
specifically, we have chosen several algorithms from the 
automotive package of the MiBench suite of benchmark 
algorithms [4] to design our programs representing five 
different devices, namely: angle conversion (D1); bit count 
(D2); cubic function (D3); and square roots (D5). In addition, 
we have included a program generating random numbers (D4). 
4.2 Data analysis 
Table 1 details a summary of statistics performed over the 
PC, SR and SP values logged during the considered devices’ 
operation (see section 4.1). In particular, “total steps” 
indicates the total number of feature values recorded during 
the entire sessions of tracing. Since a program may use the 
same feature values several times during its execution flow, 
we have calculated how many distinct values of PC are 
present in the devices’ profiles and compare this to the 
number of distinct combinations of the three features (PC, 
SR, and SP) recorded at each step of logging. Our aim is to 
compare the case of using one feature (e.g. PC) with the case 
when a combination of three features (PC, SR, and SP in this 
case) is employed. 
 
Param.\Program D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
total steps 263565 104971 205482 138011 102131 
distinct pc 429 44 1695 52 94 
distinct  pc-sr-sp 1056 60 4404 103 169 
unique pc 132 0 1376 7 16 
unique  pc-sr-sp 1056 55 4404 98 169 
 





Figure 3: Information gain graphs for D1 – the device running 
the angle conversion algorithm (left) and D3 – the device 
running the cubic function algorithm (right). 
 
 
For ICmetrics research, we are also interested in how the 
devices’ profiles differ from each other. Therefore, we have 
further refined the number of distinct PC values, and the 
combinations of PC, SR, and SP values, by finding the number 
of values/combinations that occurred in the profile of a certain 
device, but not in the profiles of the rest of the devices. This is 
reflected in “unique pc”, in case when only PC is considered 
as a feature, and “unique pc-sr-sp”, in case three features are 
employed.  
 
It can be noted from Table 1 that while taking only the PC as 
the ICmetrics feature does not allow to separate the five 
devices in the feature space (D2 has no unique PC values as 
compared to the rest of the devices), there exist combinations 
of the three features (PC, SR, and SP) that describe each of the 
devices uniquely. These unique combinations could be used 
for generating unique basis numbers for each device as 
discussed at the beginning of section 4. It is interesting to note 
that D2 and D4 share only five combinations of the PC-SR-SP 
values (60 distinct as opposed to 55 unique combinations for 
D2, and 103 distinct as opposed to 98 unique combinations for 
D4), and the remainder of the devices have these combinations 
all unique. 
 
Another interesting problem to explore for the ICmetrics 
research is to find optimal logging times so as to achieve 
maximum information gain within a minimum time. From our 
experiments, we have found that this problem should be 
addressed for each problem domain separately, depending on 
the specification of the devices employed and their 
environment of operation. To illustrate this, Figure 3 provides 
graphs of information gain based on tracing of the three 
considered features (PC, SR, and SP) for two different 
devices, D1 (left) and D3 (right). The graphs show how many 
unique combinations of the three features (axis Y) are obtained 
 at each logging step (axis X). It can be noticed from Figure 3 
that, depending on the complexity of the program running on a 
device, information gain graphs take different shape; it may 
therefore take different logging times to obtain the same 
number of unique combinations of ICmetrics features. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has introduced the ICmetrics technology – a novel 
technique that can be used for the purposes of generating 
encryption keys, electronic signatures, detecting attempts of 
frauds, or preventing malfunction of hardware components 
and systems. The technology is based on employment of 
measurable features derived from characteristics of electronic 
devices in order to generate identifiers that uniquely 
determine the devices. ICmetrics can be seen analogous to a 
biometrics based system, but employing devices’ features 
instead of those intrinsic to humans. The paper has provided 
the comparison of the proposed technology to alternative 
techniques widely used to secure electronic systems (e.g., 
PUFs, encryption, biometrics, etc.) and demonstrated the 
advantages of the ICmetrics system. We have also discussed 
the challenges associated with the implementation of 
ICmetrics and brought an example to demonstrate how some 
of these problems are being addressed in our current research. 
In particular, we have explored possible ICmetrics features 
that allow for unique identification of the devices in a given 
set. From our experimental results, we conclude that suitable 
ICmetrics features can be extracted from, for example, 
frequencies of the program counter occurrences and their 
sequences observed during programs’ execution flow. 
Furthermore, the combination of several features, such as the 
program counter, status register and stack pointer, may be 
used to separate devices in multi-dimensional space. 
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